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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , 
- v -
VERD J . ERICKSON, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 21055 
Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Should defendants convictions be reversed on the 
ground that he was entrapped? 
2. Did the trial court correctly refuse to suppress 
the evidence defendant challenges on appeal? 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant, Verd J. Ericksonf was charged by information 
with three counts of unlawful distribution for value of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony, under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1985). The trial court 
apparently sentenced defendant to only a single one to fifteen 
year term in the Utah State Prison, but stayed the prison 
sentence and placed him on conditional probation (R. 210-11). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although there were minor conflicts in the testimony 
received at trial, the following facts are, for the most part, 
undisputed. 
Having received information that defendant, a dentist 
who had an office in Taylorsville, Utah, was overprescribing and 
illegally distributing drugs to his patients, the Metro Narcotics 
Strike Force arranged to have an undercover officer, Celeste 
Paquette, meet with defendant (R. 357-58, 430-34). On the 
morning of May 24, 1985, Ms. Paquette, using the name Kris 
Gordon, arrived at defendant's office with a friend of hers. 
Once seated in the dental chair, Paquette informed defendant that 
she did not have a problem with her teeth, but was concerned 
about the effects her ingestion of "speed" (amphetamines) was 
having on them. Defendant told her that he would have to examine 
her teeth before discussing that matter (R. 359). After the 
exam, Paquette again asked defendant about the possible problem 
created by amphetamines. He responded that amphetamines 
purchased from a pharmacist would be less harmful than those 
purchased on the street. When Paquette indicated that she knew 
of no one who would write prescriptions for her, defendant told 
her he could, but that he disliked writing prescriptions because 
they left a "paper trail." Defendant then said he would consider 
writing her a prescription and asked her to return at 5:00 p.m. 
when the office closed (R. 360-63). 
Upon her return to defendant's office at five, Paquette 
was asked by defendant's receptionist to come back at 6:00 p.m. 
At six, Paquette met with defendant and asked for the amphetamine 
prescription. Rather than writing a prescription, defendant went 
to a motorcycle parked outside his office and retrieved a small 
bottle containing twenty-seven yellow pills and three black 
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capsules, some of which were later identified as amphetamines by 
the state crime lab. After stating that he wanted street value 
for the drugs, defendant exchanged them for sixty dollars in cash 
that Paquette offered (R. 364-65, 502-06). 
One week later, Paquette again met defendant at his 
office. Defendant asked her how she liked the pills she had 
received the previous week, and then freely discussed a sale of a 
large quantity of amphetamines and a smaller amount of "Demerol" 
(meperidine) to her for $5,000. He also asked Paquette whether 
she would be interested in selling or buying some Valium. The 
two agreed to make the transaction for the amphetamines and 
Demerol three days later under the pretense that Paquette would 
be coming into the office to have her teeth cleaned (R. 368-71). 
On the morning of June 3, after cleaning Paquette1s teeth, 
defendant told her to return at 6:00 p.m. to discuss the drug 
deal. When Paquette returned at that time, defendant exchanged 
the amphetamines and Demerol for $5,000 in cash that she had in 
an envelope. Immediately thereafter, approximately eight 
narcotics officers entered defendant's office and arrested him 
(R. 371-73). During this last visit to the office and on most of 
her other visits, Paquette wore a "wire" which transmitted her 
conversations with defendant to fellow narcotics officers who 
were outside with recording equipment (R. 367, 390, 414). The 
crime lab subsequently determined that the substances defendant 
gave Paquette in this last transaction were in fact amphetamines 
and Demerol (R. 509-12). 
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At trial, Paquette stated that her primary purpose in 
approaching defendant was to attempt to purchase drugs (R. 472). 
Defendant took the stand and admitted to selling Paquette drugs, 
explaining that he had engaged in the wrongful conduct because of 
financial difficulties (R. 534-61). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress 
evidence he claimed had been obtained in violation of federal and 
state constitutional provisions regarding self-incrimination and 
searches and seizures. He also filed a motion to dismiss the 
charges against him on the ground of entrapment (R. 13-29). 
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion 
to dismiss, but granted the suppression motion in part (R. 64-66, 
282-355). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because there was no evidence in defendant's case of 
the "personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals to extreme 
vulnerability present in recent entrapment cases before this 
Court," State v, Martin, 713 P.2d 60, 62 (Utah 1986), defendant's 
claim of entrapment is without merit. 
Defendant fails to present any compelling grounds for 
reversal of the trial court's rulings regarding the admissibility 
of certain evidence. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF 
HIS CONVICTION ON A THEORY OF ENTRAPMENT. 
At trial, the jury received instructions on entrapment 
(R. 36, 157, 171, 172). Defendant contends that, as a matter of 
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law, he was entrapped and therefore is entitled to a reversal of 
his conviction. However, his argument fails to identify any 
facts that would constitute entrapment. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(1) (1978) states: 
It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
This section is patterned after MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.3(1), which 
sets forth a purely objective test of entrapment. £££ State v. 
layljQJLf 599 P.2d 496, 502-03 (Utah 1979); PERKINS and BOYCE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 1171 (3d ed. 1982). In laxlQL, this Court provided 
a clear definition of the objective test: 
Under the objective view of entrapment, 
the focus is not on the propensities and 
predisposition of the specific defendant, but 
on whether the police conduct revealed in the 
particular case falls below standards, to 
which common feelings respond, for the proper 
use of governmental power. This concept 
establishes entrapment on its historical 
basis; the refusal to countenance a 
perversion of justice by government 
misconduct. The objective view provides a 
solid definitive standard upon which the 
defense can rest, i.e., does the conduct of 
the government comport with a fair and 
honorable administration of justice? 
599 P.2d at 500. The objective test focuses entirely on the 
conduct of the police and their helpers; matters such as the 
defendants character, his predisposition to commit the offense, 
and his subjective intent are irrelevant. Id. at 503; gtate v. 
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CliRBS, 692 P.2d 747, 750 n.3 (Utah 1984); People v. Barraza. 153 
Cal. Rptr. 459, 468, 591 P.2d 947, 956 (1979); PERKINS and BOYCE, 
SJUUSLLa at 1171. 
As was the case in this Court1s most recent entrapment 
opinion, "the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, does not support the conclusion that the 
methods used by [Officer Paquette] created a substantial risk 
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it." State v. Martin, 713 P.2d 60, 61-62 (Utah 1986). 
"None of the personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals to 
extreme vulnerability present in recent entrapment cases before 
this Court existed in this case." Id* at 62, citing State v. 
£JLL£CS, 692 P.2d 747 (Utah 1984); State v. Sprague. 680 P.2d 404 
(Utah 1984); State v. Taylor. 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979). Officer 
Paquette, who had information that defendant was overprescribing 
and illegally distributing drugs to his patients, merely afforded 
him the opportunity to commit the offenses charged. £f. Sprague 
and State v. Kourbelas. 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980) (where the 
concern was that undercover officers persisted in attempting to 
purchase drugs without any prior reason to believe that the 
defendants were using or selling drugs). Defendant, by his own 
admissions at trial, willingly engaged in the illegal activity. 
No evidence was presented to indicate that Paquette offered 
defendant inordinately large sums of money for the drugs or 
applied any undue pressure on him. £££ Taylor. 599 P.2d at 503. 
Therefore, defendants claim of entrapment is without merit. 
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POINT II 
BY FAILING TO OBJECT AT TRIAL TO THE EVIDENCE 
HE CHALLENGES ON APPEAL, DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY 
OBJECTIONS TO THAT EVIDENCE; ALTERNATIVELY, 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS THAT THE EVIDENCE 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED ARE WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
Although Point II of defendant's brief, Brief of 
Appellant at 18-25, is somewhat confusing, it appears that he is 
arguing that the trial court erroneously refused to suppress the 
test results on the drugs involved and the tapes of conversations 
between him and Officer Paquette. His claim apparently is that 
the police needed warrants to have the seized drugs tested for 
identification and to record the conversations between him and 
Paquette, and that Paquette was required to give him a Miranda 
(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) warning at all times 
prior to his arrest. 
As an initial matter, defendant never objected, either 
in his pretrial motion to suppress or at trial, to the 
introduction of evidence concerning the testing of the seized 
drugs on the ground that a warrant was necessary before testing 
could be done. Under these circumstances, defendant waived any 
objection to that evidence. State v. Heaps, 711 P.2d 257, 259-60 
(Utah 1985); State v. Lesley.
 6 7 2 p.2d 79, 81-82 (Utah 1983); 
State v. John, 667 P.2d 32, 33 (Utah 1983). Although defendant 
raised the issue in his post-trial motions (R. 197-208), the 
objection there was merely academic and did not preserve the 
point for appeal. £e£ Heaps* 711 P.2d at 260. 
Moreover, even if the Court were to address the issue 
on testing, defendants argument should be rejected. He cites 
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only State V, Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996 (1983), and £ta££ 
V. Westlundr 75 Or. App. 43, 705 P.2d 208 (Or. App. 1985), review 
granted. 710 P.2d 146, as authority for his position. Although 
Ls&LXX provides some support for defendants argument, Westlund— 
which held that police officers were not justified in testing, 
without first obtaining a warrant, the contents of a vial seized 
in a warrantless search of the defendant incident to his arrest— 
more directly supports it. However, Westlund and Lowry (to the 
extent that it supports the decision in Westlund) represent a 
clear minority, and poorly reasoned, position. They are clearly 
contrary to federal law and are not justifiable on state 
constitutional grounds. S&z United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 
109 (1984); Westlund. 705 P.2d at 214-18 (Van Hoomissen, J., 
concurring in part; dissenting in part), and cases cited therein. 
The following language from Jacobsenf where the Court held that a 
warrantless chemical field test of a substance suspected to be 
cocaine did not violate the Fourth Amendment, is dispositive of 
the question: 
A chemical test that merely discloses 
whether or not a particular substance is 
cocaine does not compromise any legitimate 
interest in privacy. This conclusion is not 
dependent on the result of any particular 
test. It is probably safe to assume that 
virtually all of the tests conducted under 
circumstances comparable to those disclosed 
by this record would result in a positive 
finding; in such cases, no legitimate 
interest has been compromised. But even if 
the results are negative—merely disclosing 
that the substance is something other than 
cocaine—such a result reveals nothing of 
special interest. Congress has decided—and 
there is no question about its power to do 
so—to treat the interest in "privately" 
possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus 
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governmental conduct that can reveal whether 
a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 
"private" fact, compromises no legitimate 
privacy interest, 
466 U.S. at 123. 
Finally, defendant's arguments regarding the recorded 
conversations between him and Paquette prior to his arrest are 
equally without merit. First, because UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-
4(2)(b) (1982) makes clear that it is not unlawful "for a person 
acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral 
communication, where that person is a party to the 
communication," and there is nothing in the Interception of 
Communications Act (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-l et seq. (1982)) 
that requires judicial authorization of the interception 
described in § 77-23a-4(2)(b), Paquette1s wearing of a "wire" and 
the other officers1 recording of the conversations transmitted by 
that device did not violate the provisions of the Act. Nor was 
there a constitutional violation. United States v. Caceres. 440 
U.S. 741 (1979) (no violation of fourth amendment when electronic 
bugging device is worn by a person acting as an undercover 
agent); State v. Boone, 581 P.2d 571, 573-74 (Utah 1978) (use of 
a wired undercover officer did not violate Utah Constitution or 
applicable state statute). 
Second, because defendant was not subjected to 
custodial interrogation prior to his arrest, Paquette was not 
required to give him a Miranda warning before conversing with 
him. Quite simply, none of the indicia of custodial 
interrogation were present. S&& State v. Kelly. Utah, P.2d 
, No. 19253, slip op. at 6-7 (filed May 1, 1986). And, 
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defendant was not entitled to a Miranda warning merely because a 
police investigation had focused upon him. fftate v. Benson, 712 
P.2d 256, 259 (Utah 1985). Significantly, the trial court 
suppressed the statements made by defendant to the police 
immediately after his arrest, apparently on the ground that there 
was a Miranda violation (R. 64-66), but correctly found no 
similar violation as to defendant's statements prior to his 
arrest. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
convictions should be affirmed. ^ti~~^~ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / day of May, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (J 
Assistant Attorney General 
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